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Abstract
This article discusses innovative public goods production and organizational form
selection based on a case study of the Wenzhou Private Lending Service Center,
which was founded during Wenzhou’s comprehensive financial reform in 2012.
We find that the local government granted a company the authority to manage
the private lending registration system, which was a new type of public good.
However, the company presented certain organizational characteristics of government
departments in the production of public goods. Our study suggests that the
production of innovative public goods is influenced by an uncertain technical
environment or uncertain institutional environment. Local governments will try
to reduce possible loss due to high uncertainty from both environments, an
important strategy of which is choosing the organizational form that can reduce the
risk in production and grasping the control rights of the operation of the organization.
This article provides an analytical model for organizational form selection in a
multidimensional environment.
Keywords: Innovative public goods production, Technical environment,
Institutional environment, Uncertainty, Organizational form selection
Background
In 2011, the breakout of the Wenzhou lending crisis drew the public’s attention to
“runaway” enterprise owners in Wenzhou. On March 28, 2012, an executive meeting
of the State Council established pilot areas for Wenzhou’s financial comprehensive re-
form and approved “the plan of Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province comprehensive financial
pilot reform.” This plan defined 12 main tasks of the Wenzhou comprehensive finan-
cial reform, one of which was “normalizing development of private financing, setting
regulations for the management of the private financing, setting up a registration and
record system for private lending, and establishing a sound monitoring system for
private lending.”
On April 26, 2012, an important part of the pilot financial reform was established,
the Center (later renamed the Wenzhou Private Lending Service Center, hereinafter “the
service center”). With an initial registration asset of 6 million yuan, the service
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center operated as a form of corporation that was jointly founded by 14 private
enterprises and 8 natural legal persons. Services provided by the center include in-
formation registration, information consultation, information publication, and finan-
cial docking services. The service center acts as a platform to attract the supply
and demand sides of private lending to engage in trade, in which various financing
intermediary service agencies provide services including transaction-brokered con-
tracts, notary, appraisal of assets, legal advice, and other services for both sides.
The service center itself provides registration services for signed loan contracts.
After the service center was established, many other cities in China set up simi-
lar private lending service centers.1 Interestingly, although there are differences in
the internal structure of these service centers in different cities, they share a high
level of similarity in their organizational form—almost all local governments choose
to operate the centers as a form of corporation. What is more, these service cen-
ters are registered as corporations in nature but are more similar to government
departments in the aspects of their name and actual operation.
As an innovative management system for regulating private financing, private lending
registration bears typical properties of public goods.2 Theoretically, the government
generally produces this type of public good. Why then do local governments choose en-
terprises to produce these public goods? Why do corporations present certain
organizational characteristics of government departments in the production of public
goods? What leads local governments to choose this model of production, and what is
the underlying rationale behind this particular model? The remainder of this article dis-
cusses these questions.
Existing explanations and analytical models
Existing research argues that under certain conditions public goods can be produced by
the private sector (Demsetz 1970; Coase 1974; Goldin 1977). However, it should be
noted that provision and production refer to two distinct practices (Musgrave 1959;
Ostrom et al. 1961). A goods provider takes the role of financing, leading, planning,
and monitoring, while a goods producer is mainly involved in direct production. The
goods provider and goods producer can either be from the same body or different
bodies. In the model of public goods production described above, the government
is the provider while an enterprise is the producer. Why did the government choose to
make an enterprise the producer rather than taking on this role itself?
Supply efficiency theory
One explanation to the above question comes from the supply efficiency theory, which
claims that the government makes the decision about whether to be a provider or a
producer based on a comparison of which has the higher supply efficiency. Transaction
cost economics (Coase 1937; Williamson 1979) claims the selection of provider or
producer depends on the transaction costs of the two practices. Savas (2002) points
out that provision and production by the same body generates a bureaucratic cost,
that is, the cost of maintaining and managing a bureaucratic system; provision and
production by different bodies generates a transaction cost, that is, the cost of hir-
ing and supervising an independent producer. He argues that a comparison of the
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cost between these two models will decide whether provision and production
should be separated. However, the new property rights economics (Grossman and
Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990) argues that under the condition of an incom-
plete contract, the two contracts refer to different arrangements for residual con-
trol rights, which generate different modes of incentive. The selection of provision
or production is thus a question of which contract has better production efficiency.
This theory has been used to analyze the comparative advantage of provision and
production by the government under a dual-target condition (improving quality
and cost saving): if the government prioritizes the quality of public services, then
government production is more efficient than private production; if the govern-
ment prioritizes cost savings, then private production has a higher efficiency than
government production (Hart et al. 1997).
Supply efficiency theory cannot fully explain the question posed at the beginning
of this article. First, supply efficiency theory assumes that the efficiency of the dif-
ferent modes of supply is comparable. However, in the case of a private lending
registration system, such a comparison is not feasible since the new private lending
registration system is a newly created public good, and thus, information about
transaction costs and production efficiency for different modes of provision and
production is lacking. Second, supply efficiency theory cannot explain why the cor-
poration presents certain organizational characteristics of government departments
in the production of public goods. Third, supply efficiency theory does not pay
enough attention to the environmental factors that affect governmental behavior.
As a matter of fact, many environmental factors in the field of private lending have
important influences on the government’s selection of provision or production models.
Political risk theory
An alternative explanation to the Chinese government choosing private organizations
for the production of public goods is the theory of political risk of centralization
(Fei 2009; Cai 2008; Cao 2011; Cao and Zhou 2013; Cao and Luo 2013). It argues
that a high level of concentration of political power will produce high political risk;
a common approach to reducing political risk is to vertically decentralize administrative
duties, namely from the central government to the local government (decentralization to
local) and from the local government to society (decentralization to society). In this sense,
the practice in which the government grants enterprises the right to produce public goods
is in fact a kind of vertical decentralization.
Political risk theory provides insightful explanations to the governing mechanism
of the Chinese government, but these are still not enough to answer the questions
raised by this article. First, political risk theory aims to address state-society rela-
tions and thus assumes that the state prioritizes social stability. This assumption
determines that political risk theory is mainly concerned about the social environ-
ment when addressing governing issues, rather than other types of environments
that the government also needs to address, such as the legal environment for the
production of public goods. Second, political risk theory also fails to explain why
the corporation presents certain organizational characteristics of government departments
in the production of public goods. Third, political risk theory does not discuss the specific
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procedures of the production of public goods in the condition of vertical decentralization
and thus ignores the analysis of interactions between the government and other relevant
organizations.
Analytical model
Given the limitations of the two kinds of interpretation logic discussed above, this
article uses analytical perspectives from organizational sociology to address the
question about governmental behavior in reaction to the external environment in
order to explain both the external organizational characteristics and the internal
operational mechanisms of the service center. We argue that governmental selec-
tion of direct or private production of public goods is subject to the technical en-
vironment and the institutional environment. Regarding production of innovative
public goods, high uncertainty in the technical or institutional environment will
make the local government take measures to reduce possible loss, one important
strategy of which is choosing the organizational form that can reduce the risk of
those two constraints on production and to grasp the control rights of the organi-
zation’s operation.3
An uncertain technical environment and institutional environment
Production of public goods is constrained by the technical environment and the insti-
tutional environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott and Meyer 1991; Scott 1991;
Powell 1991). Constraints from the technical environment include the request for im-
proving production efficiency and service quality, fluctuations in market demand, and
availability of resources and means of production. Constraints from the institutional
environment are legitimacy requirements about organizational structure and proce-
dures for production.
Uncertainty is a key feature of the organizational environment, and an uncertain
technical or institutional environment has significant influences on the organizational
structure and behavior. The private lending registration system discussed in this art-
icle is a new type of public good, and such public goods production is more likely to
be constrained by an uncertain environment. However, classic explanations about
organizational behavior in an uncertain environment fail to fully explain the afore-
mentioned phenomena.4 For this reason, we need a suitable concept to understand
the particular organizational strategy utilized in response to environmental uncertainty.
Selection of organizational form
A technical environment and institutional environment with high uncertainty produce
a high level of risk (the uncertainty of loss) in the production of public goods. The gov-
ernment tends to choose various strategies to reduce this high risk, one of which is the
selection of organizational form. Organizational form is a classic concept in the study
of organizations. Interpretations of the concept vary according to different theoretical
perspectives. Organizational economics views organizational form as a power allocation
method or governance structure for coordinating the relationship between subjects of
different interests (Chandler 1962; Williamson 1975, 1985; Milgrom and Roberts 1992;
Aghion and Tirole 1995; Maskin et al. 2000; Qian et al. 2006). From the perspective of
organizational ecology, organizational form is an action blueprint for carrying out
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production activities, the key features that can be used to distinguish different
organizational entities or populations including formal structure, operation mode, and
normative order of the organization (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1986; Romanelli
1991; Ruef 2000). However, the two abovementioned definitions both emphasize the in-
ternal structure of organizations; they are not able to explain complex external
organizational characteristics and the subtle association between the internal structure
and the external characteristics we have observed.
Given the limitations of the two theoretical definitions, we used Tian’s (2004) defin-
ition by which organizational form is an open and written illustration about the “official
organizational name, its purpose, property, formal structure, operational mode and
organizational rules that organizations provide to other relevant organizations (includ-
ing regulatory bodies and the general public).”5 This definition emphasizes three char-
acteristics of organizational form. The first feature is externality. Just like the face of an
organization, organizational form is the appearance that organizations present to the
external environment. This means organizational form is the communication media
that has symbolic significance between an organization and the environment. The sec-
ond feature of organizational form is stability; that is, the combination mode of differ-
ent elements (such as names, properties, and targets) of an organizational form has a
high level of stability. The third feature is plasticity, which refers to the idea that
organizational form can occur and maintain deformation when organizations are under
external environment pressure. This kind of deformation can occur in a specific elem-
ent of a certain organizational dimension or in the combination mode of certain ele-
ments of different organizational dimensions. All these deformations are relevant to
organizations’ rational choices under external environment pressure.
In this article, this so-called organizational form selection refers to an organization’s
selection of an organizational form or a combination of different organizational forms
among all available choices in order to reduce the risk constraints from external envi-
ronments. The reason organizational form selection is helpful in reducing these risk
constraints lies in the fact that the risks that different organizational forms face vary in
their properties and degrees. For example, some risks may be associated only with cer-
tain types of organizational forms but not with other types, and the same risks may
have different degrees of impact on different organizational forms. In other words, dif-
ferent organizational forms have their own comparative advantages in reducing differ-
ent risks. This particular feature provides an important strategy for the survival and
development of organizations in uncertain environments; organizations can thus com-
pare and choose among available organizational forms to maximally reduce risks due
to the uncertainty of environments.
We categorize risks that organizations face into two types; one comes from the
technical environment (technical risk) and the other from the institutional environ-
ment (institutional risk) (shown in Fig. 1). In a set of available organizational
forms, A refers to an organizational form with both high technical and institutional
risk, B refers to an organizational form with high technical risk but low institu-
tional risk, C refers to an organizational form with low technical risk and high
institutional risk, and D indicates an organizational form with both low technical
and institutional risk. Organizations choose among the four available options in
order to minimize risks.
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Appling this analytical model to the production of public goods, if only from a
lower risk perspective, the government would naturally prefer organizational form D.
However, reality is more complex than the theory explained here. It may be that
organizational form D is not available; another possibility is that even if all four
organizational forms are available the selection of organizational form D is con-
strained by other factors. Under such conditions, the government may select
organizational form B or C or combine B and C to create a new hybrid organizational
form. From this perspective, the hybrid organizational characteristics of the service
center studied in this article were caused by the government combining elements
from the organizational form of an enterprise and the organizational form of govern-
ment departments (such as property of enterprise and name of government depart-
ments). The rationale behind it was the local government’s intent to maximally
reduce both technical and institutional risks.
Distribution of control rights
Organizational form and organizational operation (Tian 2004) are not necessarily as-
sociated; rather, they are often decoupled (Meyer and Rowan 1977). If organizational
form is the appearance that organizations present to external environments,
organizational operation then contains the real action logic of the organization. In
particular, when a hybrid organizational form appears, only through organizational
operation is one able to understand organizational behavior in depth. In the case of
the government authorizing enterprises to undertake the production of public goods,
one key criterion to assessing organizational operation is the distribution of actual
control rights, that is, how decision-making rights are distributed between the gov-
ernment and the enterprise.
Despite the new property rights economics claims that residual control rights are
often granted to asset owners under the condition of incomplete contracts (Grossman
and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990), in real life, the actual distribution of control
rights tends to be more complex. Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) research about organiza-
tions’ internal formal authority and real authority provides useful insights. They point
out that due to information asymmetry the agent often possesses the real decision-
making authority, and although the principal is the decision-making party, he actually
possesses the formal authority. What is more, the agent’s real authority undermines the











Fig. 1 Risk constraint and organizational form
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principal’s formal authority to a certain extent. In this case, in order to reduce informa-
tion asymmetry, the principal tends to strengthen supervision over the agent. However,
this supervision generates extra cost for the principal, and thus, the principal must
balance the costs of supervision and the benefits of control rights.
In the production of innovative public goods, the contract between the government
and the enterprise is highly incomplete. Once the government chooses an enterprise
to produce public goods, the enterprise possesses an information advantage, thus
undermining the government’s control rights over the production of public goods to
some extent. Therefore, when the government deems the benefit of these control
rights to be higher than its cost, it competes to obtain the control rights. Zhou and
Lian (2012) specify the control rights associated with internal organizational oper-
ation as goal-setting rights, assessing and censoring rights, and incentive distribution
rights. Their study suggests that through adjustment of the distribution of assessing
and censoring rights, the principal can reduce the real authority held by the agent
due to the information advantage. This further highlights the government’s grasp of
assessing and censoring rights in the actual production of public goods. From this
perspective, we can observe the micromechanisms through which the government
intervenes in and controls the operation of the organization.
Methods
This article uses the Wenzhou Private Lending Registration Service Center as a case to
discuss the selection of organizational form for the production of innovative public
goods. One of the authors of this article participated in drafting the Wenzhou Private
Lending Registration Service Center’s pilot program (detailed description below), which
provided an opportunity to closely observe the decision-making process regarding the
construction of the service center, as well as the mechanism of governmental interven-
tion in the process. After the service center had been established, we were commis-
sioned by the local government to study risk management and control and to draft
regulatory rules for the service center.6 This involvement in these commissions allowed
further observation of the service center’s operational process. By the end of February
2014, we had carried out nearly 3 months of participatory observation; in addition, we
collected data from in-depth interviews and focus group studies.
The author’s opportunity to participate in the Wenzhou Private Lending Registration
Service Center’s pilot program was due to his participation in an earlier project, the
“financial innovation research in Q City (a subordinate county-level city of Wenzhou)
in Zhejiang Province” in July 2009. This research found that county-level govern-
ments had very limited power to reform the local financial system; market access re-
form and the reform of interest rate marketization in the banking sector had to be
approved by the central government. What is more, civil lending behavior was limited
to individual lending at that time, and most of the individual lending occurred be-
tween relatives and friends. In individual lending, the volume of loans was often con-
strained. After analyzing the above results, the research team suggested that direct
lending between strangers via local governments could be an innovative move for
local financial systems. Direct lending transactions between strangers require inter-
mediaries; however, relevant law strictly forbids an unregistered private depository in-
stitution from providing deposit and lending services. Then is it possible to develop
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an intermediary service for direct lending without participating in a deposit and lend-
ing transaction?
An investigation was carried out to assess the possibility of developing such a
practice. The research group found that at that time there was an established busi-
ness model for lending between strangers, often referred to as the “P2P” model.7
The main characteristic of this model is that the intermediary does not participate
in the deposit and lending service but provides information, credit assessment, and
transaction services for individual lending. Is this practice legal? Can the risks asso-
ciated with this business model be controlled? Which department is responsible for
regulating this service? All these questions had yet to be clearly answered.
The research team thus suggested that the local government of Q City build a
unified platform for a variety of private lending brokers; these brokers could use
this platform to provide intermediary services, including brokering deals, contract
notarization, and consulting for civil lending. The research team also suggested
that at the same time the local government should provide registration service for
private lending contracts and monitor civil lending. The platform was named the
“private financial transactions registration center.” After consulting with the local
government and experts in finance, the research team submitted a feasibility report
on the suggested platform to financial officials of Q City in early November 2009.
In this feasibility report, the research team stated that the service center needed to
address two questions: how to promote private lending and how to monitor the
transaction. Some suggestions were made accordingly in the report.
In addition, the report proposed four types of organizational forms for the service
center: “government-affiliated institution,” “social group,” “state-owned enterprise (SOE),”
and “private enterprise.”8 In comparison to the other three organizational forms, the
government-affiliated institution type of service center may have the highest credibility,
especially for the supply party of the transaction. However, in the event of a dis-
pute between two parties in the transaction, the government would necessarily be
involved in resolving disputes had the service center been run as a government-
affiliated institution. This was the problem that most concerned the government of
Q City. What is more, the establishment of a government-affiliated institution had
to face the constraints of the Bianzhi system (a staffing regulation system). In
January 2010, the Q City financial office was informed that in the short term it
could not set up the service center as a government-affiliated institution.
In comparison to a “government-affiliated institution” type, the “social group” type may
act as a buffering layer for the government in the event of private lending disputes.
However, this type of service center has lower credibility, in particular for the supply side
of the transaction. In addition, if the civil association type was chosen, there could be risks
regarding the management of transaction data. In January 2010, the Department of Civil
Affairs of Zhejiang Province informed the research team that the service center would be
a profit-oriented organization and thus could not be registered as a “social group.” After
carefully considering the credibility of the demand and supply sides of private lending
transactions, potential liability for the government, and other barriers, in January 2010,
the Q City government decided to grant a local government-owned enterprise the rights
to run the service center and register it as an SOE. However, for various reasons, the ser-
vice center at Q City was not able to open for business for a fairly long time.
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In the second half of 2011, “runaway” local business owners who abandoned their
businesses and moved out of the local city became a major issue in Wenzhou city.
One particular case, that of the runaway local “spectacles king,” Hu Fulin, that oc-
curred on September 20, 2011, drew national attention to the financial crisis in Wenzhou.
The Wenzhou city government had already begun to resolve the aftermath of the
private financial crisis and started applying to the State Council to build a pilot
area for comprehensive financial reform. In early September 2011, Professor Yao
XianGuo, member of the advisory board of Wenzhou city and Zhejiang province
and leader of the Q City financial innovation research group, once again proposed
building a service center for Wenzhou city and Zhenjiang province and submitted
a modified blueprint of the service center. His proposal was subsequently written
in the pilot program for consideration by Zhejiang province and the State Council.
In November 2011, one author of this article was invited to discuss the plan for
constructing the service center with the Wenzhou Lucheng district government.
Before the discussion, the Wenzhou Lucheng district had been chosen to run the
pilot private lending service center. During the discussion, the author introduced
the topic of construction of the service center in Q City and the pros and cons of
the four organizational forms of the service center. The Lucheng district govern-
ment favored a private enterprise type.
On April 26, 2012, the service center, jointly built by 14 member organizations
of the Lucheng Industrial and Commercial Association and 8 natural persons, offi-
cially opened for business. Interestingly, the enterprise was named the “Wenzhou
Private Lending Registration Service Center.”9 The organization of the service cen-
ter is jointly run by the local government and a local enterprise (Fig. 2) that is
under the control of the Wenzhou city government and the Lucheng district gov-
ernment. The Wenzhou Private Lending Registration Services Limited Company
was founded to operate the service center. The service center invited P2P financial
information service agents and other related ancillary service agents into the ser-
vice center and invited supply and demand parties in private lending for potential
deals. The service center does not engage in the intermediary business; rather, it
serves as a platform for intermediary agents and related ancillary service agents
and provides private lending registration services. The intermediary agents provide






Fig. 2 Organizational model of the service center
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vehicle security check-in kiosks, notaries, secured companies, and insurance com-
panies; law firms provide services that include letters of inquiry, mortgage registra-
tion, notarization, and consultation regarding insurance and legal advice.10 The
service center has received a great deal of support from external administrative
resources.
The organization and operation of the service center present complex organizational
characteristics. In terms of organizational property, the service center is indeed a
registered enterprise, but in its name and its capability of mobilizing resources, the
service center is more like a government department or a government-affiliated in-
stitution. In particular, it is different from what was proposed in the blueprint for
the service center. There is no “appropriate corporate name” added to its name; in
addition, it has access to and adopted the credit system of the People’s Bank of
China, motor vehicle security check-in kiosks, and other resources that general
businesses often find no way to obtain (Table 1).
With this in mind, we need to answer the following three questions: why does the
government allow an enterprise to produce innovative public goods in a civil lending
registration? Why does corporate production of the public goods present certain
organizational characteristics of government departments? Who controls the actual
operation of the service center—the local government or the local enterprise?
Results
Why does the government allow an enterprise to produce innovative public goods?
We argue that the government’s selection of producing public goods in a form of a cor-
poration is constrained by the external institutional environment. As an innovative
public good, private lending registration involves not only financial legislation in the
field of civil finance legislation but also social awareness of the parties participating in
the transaction. The top-down legal constraints and the bottom-up social awareness
Table 1 Public sectors and their relevant services at the service center
Public sector Relevant services
People’s Bank of China Inquiry on the personal credit record in the PBC personal credit
query system. The service center is the first nonbanking institution
which provides this service in China.
Vehicle Administrative Vehicle/automobile mortgage business in private lending can be
directly registered at the service center with the special line from
the Wenzhou Vehicle Administrative.
Industrial and Commercial Bureau For private lending with equity mortgages, intellectual property
rights mortgages, and device mortgages; these can be directly
registered with the Industrial and Commercial Bureau.
Housing Management Bureau For private lending with housing mortgages; the Housing
Management Bureau can directly register and shorten the
registration procedure.
Highway Department For private lending with taxi operation rights as mortgages; the
service center helps to notarize in the Zhongxin notary office and
register in the Highway Department.
People’s Court For registered transactions, whenever a dispute occurs, the People’s
Court is able to provide express service; when violation of a
transaction occurs, the People’s Court is able to implement
a court ruling without litigation.
Resources are from http://www.wzmjjddj.com/
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have created two essential institutional environments for the local government, and the
potential risk in the two environments has a major influence on the government’s selec-
tion of the organizational form for the service center.
The legal risk: the top-down institutional environment
It has been acknowledged that with the national administrative reform and the increase
in the rationality of the administrative system (Zhang 2001; Qu et al. 2009; Lv 2013),
legalization, technology, and standardization have gradually become important issues
for the development of the administrative system, and legal constraints have become
even stronger for local governments. In order to pursue a better political future, local
government officials have had to balance system incentives (Zhou 2004, 2007; Rong
et al. 1998) and legal constraints (Mao 2005; Wang and Wang 2009) in order to
improve their political performance, that is, not only improve efficiency but also
control liability risks. That is why local governments focus on both supply effi-
ciency and legitimacy of governmental behavior in order to avoid legal risks.
(1) The lack of laws. The private finance business in China has long been a legal
gray area. There is a lack of a good legal and regulatory system or a clear regulatory
department for this type of business.11 In particular, there is no clear legal system or
regulatory department to monitor newly invented civil lending services which are reg-
istered as “Economic Information Consulting Co., Ltd.” or “Investment Management
Co., Ltd.”
Before the launch of relevant laws and regulations, there were no laws or regula-
tions to guide a local government in setting up its own center, introducing broker
institutions for private lending, and providing registration service. However, if such
an intermediary role was undertaken by an enterprise, it would be regarded as con-
tractual relations in a market. This helps to prevent direct contact between private
lending and the government, thus reducing the government’s legal risk. For this
reason, the district government chose enterprises to produce public goods and, in
the meantime, strongly promoted the introduction of relevant regulations for the
service center. As one regional financial officer observed:
Regarding the organizational model of the service center, in terms of the legal
perspective although many functions of government are subject to particular
laws or regulations there is no such law or regulation for running the service
center and thus the leadership in the government decided to allow the market
to provide such services. … The government’s behavior must be supported by
law, and if you look at information and consulting companies they are in a gray
area; there is no legal system to regulate this sector. It is thus better for enterprises to
run this type of business because it is regarded as market behavior, and there is
no authority responsible for regulating their operation.… The provincial government
has long been drafting the “Wenzhou private lending regulation,”12 and when it comes
out we [the government] will use it to provide private lending registration. (Interview
record 20130130)
(2) Legal friction. The establishment of a private lending registration system also
faces certain challenges from the legal system; one typical challenge comes from
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tax regulation.13 In civil lending, creditors usually pay no tax for interest on loans.
However, once the transaction is registered with the service center, the interest
must be taxed. If the government requires taxing on interest, it greatly decreases
the incentive for private lending to use the service; if the government does not tax
the interest, then it will violate relevant tax regulations. In response to this di-
lemma, a rational choice of the government is to alter the organizational form of
the service center in order to circumvent the tax regulation. Below is a quote from
an official of a district financial office:
Although this is a part of the financial reform, if certain laws or regulations are not
altered accordingly then we cannot ignore those legal constraints. … At that time
what worried me most was in fact the question of taxation; the taxation should
follow the state’s law! The tax law requires the government to tax on behalf of
the state. If the government runs the service center, then should I deduct the
tax or not? Once the private lending transaction is registered at the center, I
have all of the relevant data. It would be fine if the tax bureau does not check,
but if it checks how should I respond? Should I show them the record? If they
found out that we did the tax deduction, then it would be the government’s
liability. If an enterprise provides the registration service the law requires you to
voluntarily declare this information, so if you do not declare then it is your own
responsibility and has nothing to do with government. It was really a big problem at
the time, and we could do nothing. (Interview record 20130620)
(3) Uncertainty associated with the implementation of the law. Although in the
financial area basic legal provisions for civil financial activities have created many
constraints for such activities, many of these legal provisions are not clear
enough.14 Under such conditions, there is a very vague line between legal and il-
legal private financial activities, which causes great uncertainty for the implementa-
tion of the law. Under such circumstances, there is a high legal risk for the
government to regulate civil financing. The local government tends to feel some
civil financial activities may be judged illegal in court rulings when there is a dis-
pute, which makes it difficult for the local government to avoid responsibility. In
the case discussed here, the government would face a high legal risk if it owned
and ran the service center.
Social risk: a bottom-up institutional environment
As pointed out in a study by Cao and Zhou (2013), the government’s production
of public goods may face certain social challenges. For one thing, in producing
public goods, the local government may threaten certain public interests or ac-
cepted social norms, which could cause public discontent and protest. Additionally,
the increasing awareness of interest of the policy object (Lv 2013) together with
the strategic use of petition, complaints, and other social protests has become an
important institutional environment for the local government and created con-
straints for the local government’s legitimacy. Therefore, the central government
has emphasized social harmony, and local governments tend to be very sensitive to
any potential social risk.
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There are many potential risks in private lending, in particular the borrower default
risk. In the circumstance in which the government runs the service center, once
there is a case of borrower default the victim in the case may request that the
government pay for liability. If the victim is dissatisfied with the government’s
resolution, an petition or protest can be used. Taking this possibility into consideration,
the district government in the case chose an enterprise to undertake the production of
public goods. One leader of the government stated: “To be frank, we in the government
are also afraid of undertaking this business because whether in Wenzhou or any
other place when there is an accident the public usually blames the government, a
specific situation that is habit for the civil society. If the government is going to
run the service center, it is very difficult to gauge the degree of risks. In addition,
there is concern about social harmony; we have to take a lot into consideration
(Interview record, 20130130).”
It should be noted that the government faces social risks in both direct and indirect
regulation of the service center. The main difference between the two models is that
indirect regulation can reduce the government’s social risk relatively. For the case
here, in which the government promoted the establishment of the service center, the
public may still require the government to be liable for risks associated with transac-
tions. However, the role that the government plays here is more like a monitor and
coordinator, and thus, the public cannot assume the government holds direct respon-
sibility for potential risks. Therefore, the government faces a lower degree of social
risk when indirectly running the service center.
Selection of private enterprise
Facing multiple risks, the government would not set up and operate the service
center by itself. Why then would the government choose private enterprises to run
the service center? One official at the district financial office stated that while the
privately run nonenterprise form, SOE, and private enterprise can all reduce risks
for the government, the selection of a particular form is also influenced by other
constraints.
We discussed with leaders for a long time and were mainly considering a private
nonprofit organization, but a private nonprofit organization is normally registered
as a public service organization, which is not allowed to undertake financial
business. We then negotiated with the Bureau of Civil Affairs but we couldn’t find
a solution. The remaining choices were an SOE or a private enterprise, but there
were no suitable SOEs in our district that could undertake such business. Therefore we
decided to choose a financially successful private enterprise. Choosing a private
enterprise meant that we also needed to think about the government’s role in
the operation of the service center. Though a private enterprise is profit oriented, it
should be in accordance with our original plan for the service center. However, an
enterprise is a market actor and we needed to take this into account, so it was very
complex situation. Later on we thought about the local Industrial and Commercial
Union. After all, the Industrial and Commercial Union serves as a bridge between the
government and civil society, and thus we could have influence on it. In addition, the
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chair of the union in our district, Mr. Li, is a very respectable entrepreneur.
Hence we asked Mr. Li to initiate the construction of the service center. He had
our plan and we asked them to make their own decisions as to how to build the
center. Later a new enterprise with twenty-two vice-chairmen of the union was
founded. (Interview record 20130130)
It can be seen that in both conditions, a private enterprise is the organizational
form that can largely reduce the institutional risks faced by the government. The
government’s selection of a private enterprise also involved careful consideration.
Eventually, the government selected the Industrial and Commercial Union to found
a new enterprise to operate the service center, which signaled the union’s political
significance. Han (2004) argues that the Industrial and Commercial Union acts as
a “double agent” between the government and civil society. This dual role gives the
industrial and commercial union strong organizational flexibility so that it can
switch its role between public and private agent depending on the situation. The
dual role allows the district government to balance the production of public goods
by a private enterprise and governmental control of the service center.
Why does corporate production of the public goods present certain organizational
characteristics of government departments?
We argue that the corporate production of public goods presents certain organizational
characteristics of government departments due to the government’s rational choice in
dealing with constraints from the technical environment. This constraint refers to
market risk, i.e., whether the service center as a type of innovative public good
had a market when the civil trust system was hit hard in the financial crisis. As
analyzed above, utilizing a private enterprise can reduce institutional risk for the
government, and thus, the government chose to let a private enterprise produce
public goods. However, although a private enterprise can reduce institutional risk,
it does not have the competitive advantage that allows it to lower market risk.
Therefore, the government needed to add bureaucratic elements into the corporate
production of public goods.
An enterprise with a government brand
Although the local government allowed a private enterprise to operate the service cen-
ter, it did not name the service center as an enterprise but rather the “Wenzhou Private
Lending Registration Service Center.” In other words, the government defined the ser-
vice center as a private enterprise but named it with a government brand. One official
from the district financial office gave the following reasons:
The original name was the Wenzhou civil lending registration service center; this is
because although our center is an enterprise, it is a special type of enterprise that is
directed by the local government to provide a private lending registration service. It
would mislead the public if the center was called an enterprise, and thus the center
was registered as an enterprise but named as a service center. Think about it, why
does someone give his personal information to a private enterprise? The government
would like to provide such a service but was afraid of failure, so it let the market
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provide the service and grants it credibility by using the name of “service
center.” Although the center has the nature of an enterprise, most people still
think that this is set by the government, otherwise they would not come and
register. They choose the service center mainly because of their trust in the
government. (Interview record 20140225)
The name “Wenzhou Private Lending Registration Service Center” indicates higher
credibility, which helps to produce more private lending transactions and registra-
tions. In fact, this uses government credit as a signal (Zhang 2010) to reduce informa-
tion asymmetry between the supply side and demand side of private lending. The
service center was founded in the context of financial crises; if it used an enterprise’s
name, it would be difficult to gain the trust of the market. In contrast, a government
brand is an effective signal (Spence 1973) that has the comparative advantage of low-
ering market risk.
Resources that are difficult for an enterprise to mobilize
In addition to the credibility given by the name of the service center, the service
center still needed to obtain a comparative advantage in terms of financial security,
standardization of procedure, and transaction convenience in order to promote private
lending transactions. In the context of high information asymmetry, the service center
needed to show its mode of operation and its capacity for preventing transaction risk and
increasing transaction efficiency to both the demander and supplier in private lending, es-
pecially the supplier.
Established in the context of the financial crisis, the service center would also have
little market confidence if it functioned the same as a private enterprise, that is, relying
on intermediary agents to proceed with transactions and prevent potential risk. In con-
trast, a government-led mobilization of resources is conducive to improving risk pre-
vention, control capacity, and operational efficiency. In terms of risk management and
control, the resources mobilized by the government include pretransaction risk control
and posttransaction risk disposal, mainly in the forms of the credit query system of the
People’s Bank of China as well as express service by the People’s Courts. In terms of
transaction efficiency, the resources mainly include public notaries, vehicle mortgage
registration service, and services from the Housing Management Bureau, Industrial and
Commercial Bureau, and other public sectors.
There is no doubt that government-led resource mobilization is an effective signal
(Spence 1973) that helps the service center obtain trust from both the demander and
supplier in private lending. It is effective because this mobilization can provide the ser-
vice center with a high capability of risk control and transaction efficiency, which or-
dinary intermediary agents cannot obtain. It also involves a larger scale of resource
mobilization, and the resources the service center obtains are of better quality. In terms
of scale of resource mobilization, there are many administrative bodies that support the
function of the service center, which creates a “resource-intensive” project (Zhou 2005).
In terms of resource quality, rare resources such as the credit query system of the
People’s Bank of China are provided. In short, the bureaucratic features of the ser-
vice center are the results of governmental rational choice that aims to reduce the
service center’s market risk.
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Government control of corporate production of public goods
As analyzed earlier in this article, when the government chooses to let a private enter-
prise produce public goods, it faces information asymmetry that could weaken its
control over the production process. However, if the government deems the returns
of investment in obtaining control rights are higher than the cost, then it will com-
pete for the control rights. Thus, even though the government chooses corporate pro-
duction of public goods, this does not necessarily mean that enterprises obtain the
actual control rights.
Before analyzing how the government obtains the actual control rights, it is necessary
to discuss why the government competes for the control rights. It needs to be pointed
out that the service center is part of the pilot project for financial reform in Wenzhou,
and Lucheng district is responsible for the service center pilot project. Thus, the devel-
opment of this service center would be evaluated as part of the district government’s
political performance. There are many potential risks associated with private lending,
and if these risks occur, the service center and the district government would not be
able to resolve them. Thus, the district government has to strengthen its monitoring
and control of the service center in order to prevent risks. The monitoring includes not
only post-event supervision but also pre-event and mid-event supervision. The follow-
ing part analyzes the distribution of control rights between the government and private
enterprise via the government’s monitoring policy and direct intervention in the service
center’s operation.
Allocation of control rights in monitoring policy
On December 12, 2012, the district government issued the “Wenzhou Private Lending
Service Center regulation measures (Trial),” which monitored services offered by the
service center, intermediary agencies and other ancillary services, and so on. The
methods show that although the government allowed a private enterprise to operate
the service center, the government maintained close and careful control over the ser-
vice center’s operation. For example, rules made by the private enterprise regarding the
operation of the service center as well as the selection of intermediary agencies had to
be approved by the government. In addition, the private enterprise had to report
all transaction data and information about intermediary agencies to the govern-
ment. Lastly, the government uses a dynamic monitoring system to assess the op-
eration of the private enterprise. This indicates that the local government rather
than the private enterprise holds the actual control rights of the service center.
Allocation of control rights in daily operations
In addition to the monitoring methods issued by the government, the local govern-
ment has another method of control in the actual operation of the service center.
A typical example is that the local government sets up a supervisory office and as-
signs a deputy director from the local financial office to take charge of supervising
the service center’s daily operations.15
The administrative structure of the service center consists of the general manager’s
offices and four other functioning departments (Fig. 3). The general manager is re-
sponsible for the overall operation of the service center and has decision-making
rights. The department of the general office is responsible for core functions of the
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service center including information consultation for both the demand and supply
sides of the private lending and transaction registration services. The administrative
office is responsible for transaction file management. The finance and personnel office
is in charge of finance and personnel issues in the service center. Our fieldwork shows
that the supervisory office set by the district government has significant impact on
the administrative structure of the center and also on the actual operation of the center.
These impacts are indicated by the interaction between the supervisor and general man-
ager and the relationship between the general office and administrative office.
First, regarding the interactions between the supervisory office and the general
manager, the supervisory office has direct intervention in the decision-making process
at the center, which undermines the autocracy of the general manager. The center
often deals with important issues such as marketing, maintaining relations with
banks, and risk prevention and control, which need direct intervention by leadership.
Our field observations show that there are two methods of intervention. First is the
bottom-up method; that is, the general management office reports information to the
general manger and the supervisory office for consideration, and a decision is made
by the supervisory office. The second method is top-down; that is, the supervisory of-
fice passes decisions regarding the service center made by the district or city govern-
ment to the general manager and the general office.
Second, regarding the relationship between the supervisory office and the general
management office, the supervisory office has direct control over the daily function-
ing of the management office. The management office is in charge of the entire trans-
action in private lending, which includes information dissemination and registration
of transactions, regulating intermediaries and ancillary services, and the interrelation-
ship between the center and intermediary agencies. Our field observations showed
that the general management office regularly reports to the supervisory office about
its daily work; the supervisory office comments on the work, and the general manage-
ment office adjusts their day-to-day work accordingly.
Third, regarding the relationship between the supervisory office and the adminis-































Fig. 3 Actual administrative hierarchy of the service center
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management at the service center. In private lending transactions, a large amount
of transaction data is generated, and maintaining the security of the information is
a vital job of the service center. The supervisory office controls the information
flow in two ways: one is the use of information technology to limit access to the
data by departments of the center; the other is to supervise the management of ad-
ministrative office on the hard copies of all transaction records.
In conclusion, the supervisory office holds actual control rights over the center via
direct intervention in the decision-making procedure and in the daily work of the
general management office and general administrative office. In addition, the super-
visory office reduces the information asymmetry between the private enterprise and
the local government. In this sense, the local government holds the actual control
rights over the operation of the center. It is in fact the actual producer of the public
goods discussed here. The corporate production of public goods is more of a symbolic
organizational form.
Conclusion and discussion
This study examines an interesting phenomenon that appeared during the folk fi-
nancial reform in 2012; that is, the government authorizes corporations to produce
innovative public goods, but the corporation presents several organizational charac-
teristics of government departments in production. Existing theories do not provide
satisfying explanations for this phenomenon. We thus used the theoretical perspec-
tive of organizational sociology to develop a new analytical framework. Our re-
search shows that production of innovative public goods is subject to uncertainties
in the technical or institutional environment; one important strategy of the local govern-
ment for reducing possible loss due to this uncertainty is to select an organizational form
that can reduce the risk in production and to grasp the actual control rights of the pro-
duction. Applying this analytical framework to the Wenzhou Private Lending Service
Center, we discovered that the local government, in response to both technical and insti-
tutional risks, chose a mixed organizational form for the service center and obtained the
actual control rights of its operation.
For the case studied here, we proposed a sociological explanation that differs
from economic explanations. Transaction cost economics and the new property
rights explanation emphasize the efficiency mechanism in the bilateral trade rela-
tions between the government and the private sector. However, this article argues
that the external institutional environment also has a major impact on the govern-
ment’s behavior. Specifically, the risk-averse mechanism that we have revealed from
the perspective of organizational sociology attaches great importance to external
environmental constraints and the government’s strategic behavior. It should be
noted that we do not disagree with efficiency explanations of economics but rather
provide a sociological explanation to this kind of question as a supplement. There-
fore, when the local government selects the private sector to produce public goods,
it is likely to be based on efficiency considerations of the modes of supply and is
equally likely to be a reaction of organizational form selection to constraints from
the external environment. In this sense, in order to discover the real logic behind
a governmental behavior, not only does the interaction between government and
private sector have to be examined but also the external environment that could
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influence governmental behavior. Especially for research on innovative public goods
production, the behavior logic of the local government in an uncertain environ-
ment that this article has revealed is worth further attention.
Although this article focuses on the production of innovative public goods, the find-
ings of this article may infer similar organizational phenomena in other sectors. For
example, the Red Hat enterprises discussed in organizational sociology bear some
similarities to the case studied here. The former refers to private enterprises that wear
the “hat of government” and the latter refers to the government putting on the “shell
of enterprise.” Governmental penetration into business associations (Liu 2012) is an-
other example similar to the case studied in this article. Government-led nongovern-
ment organizations (Tian 2004) are another similar example. Both refer to a carefully
selected organizational form that allows the government to maintain actual control
rights to organizational operation.
Why is this a common practice in China? What are the similarities and differences
between these common practices? In essence, it is a practice of utilizing a nominal
organizational form to achieve certain organizational aims; the actual operation of the
organization is different from its nominal form. It involves interactions between organi-
zations, as well as interactions between organizations and the external environment.
The new institutionalism of organizational sociology uses the concept of an organiza-
tion’s legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Suchman 1995;
Zhou 2003) to explain such an organizational phenomenon. It argues that in reaction
to uncertainty in the environment, an organization tends to choose an accepted
organizational form in order to achieve organizational aims. This theory can explain
the Red Hat strategy but cannot fully explain the production of public goods by private
enterprise. This is because this approach assumes that a stable institution exists;
however, in the case studied here, no stable institutions exist, and the government
has to make decisions in such a context. In this sense, the governmental choice
studied here is not based on an evaluation of which organizational form is accept-
able but rather on the degree of acceptance of organizational forms. This selection
process itself bears certain risks.
More importantly, the phenomenon discussed in this article may have different char-
acteristics; it may have a hybrid organizational form or a multiple organizational form.
In fact, the hybrid organizational form is common in other sectors. For example, Shen
and Sun (2007) study the organizational form of the China Youth Foundation and dis-
cover that the hybrid organizational form has dual roles of “dual institutional space”
and “risky institutional environment.” It should be noted that the organizational form
discussed in organizational sociology is different from the organizational form studied
in this article; the former emphasizes the differences between organizational char-
acteristics and internal operation, but the latter focuses on the multiple dimensions
of an organizational characteristic. In addition, the former discusses the selection
of organizational form in a single-dimensional environment, but the latter discusses
the selection of organizational form in a multidimensional environment. The theory
of selection of organizational form in a single-dimensional environment cannot ex-
plain the selection of organizational form in a multidimensional environment.
This article provides alternative explanations to the hybrid organizational form; that
is, this type of organizational form is the result of constraints from a multidimensional
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environment, and the implementation of this organizational form is subject to a ra-
tional choice from comparing different organizational forms. The actual operation
of the organization shows interactions between various organizations. This analyt-
ical model may direct us to another interesting question, that is, the multidimen-
sional environment of certain organizations. Why do different organizational forms
have different competitive advantages when reducing pressure from the external
environment? What is the mechanism for an organization to reduce pressure from the ex-
ternal environment? Can a legitimate mechanism explain complex organizational forms
in a multidimensional environment? How can different organizations with different
organizational aims create hybrid organizational forms via interactions? How can the ac-
tual operation of the hybrid organizational form resolve conflicts between different inter-
est parties? These questions await further exploration.
Endnotes
1Erdos, Changsha, Ninghai, Zibo, Changzhi, and other cities in China have similar
organizations.
2According to Samuelson’s definition (1954), public goods are a nonexclusive and
noncompetitive consumption. The government regulates the production, distribu-
tion, and management of public goods.
3In the production of public goods, governments at different levels face different
risk constraints. This article focuses on grassroots-level governments.
4Thompson’s (1967) analysis of the buffering layer between the technical core
and external environment is instructive, but he focuses on the influence of the
technical environment on the internal structure of an organization. He does not
discuss the institutional environment, and thus, his theory cannot explain the case
studied by this article—the service center shows complex characteristics, and these
characteristics are linked with the actual internal operation of the service center.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) emphasize that isomorphism can reduce the pressure
from uncertainty, but it cannot provide satisfying explanations to the case studied
here. Because the private lending practice is a newly established institution, it can-
not borrow from previous institutions to regulate its function. Many local govern-
ments in this case may imitate Wenzhou, but as a pioneer, Wenzhou cannot imitate
anyone. In addition, the isomorphism existing in this case is due to a similar external en-
vironment faced by local governments, because the innovation practice of Wenzhou gov-
ernment has not been proved to be successful yet.
5The term organizational form bears a similar meaning in the rest of this article.
6This is the draft for the “Wenzhou Private Lending Registration Service Center regu-
lation methods (trial)” (Wenlu government office 2012 [285] document).
7“P2P” refers to peer to peer.
8The proposal for the establishment of the service center states that the Q city
government can set up a public-service organization, or civil-association form of a
service center, or the city finance bureau and city-owned enterprises can establish
a “state-owned enterprise.” If there are qualified private enterprises that are interested in
participating, they can found a “private enterprise” to run the service center. The
organizational form of the service center has to consider market confidence, government
regulations, and potential liability for the government. A public-service organization type
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of service center has higher market confidence but has lower risk-control capabil-
ity. The second method is to set up an industrial association to provide business
consultation, and the association will manage the operations of the service center.
Given the current development of the consulting industry in Q city, the utilization
of an association for a service center has certain difficulties. A feasible plan is to
set up an SOE, which has high confidence from relevant parties. The other method
is to set up a private enterprise, using the market mechanism and the government’s
policy support to operate the service center. If the above plan is adopted, a special
name should be given to the service center.
9The official Web site of the service center (http://www.wzmjjddj.com/) has all
the information about names, property, aims, and services of the service center.
The Wenzhou Private Lending Registration Service Center is a limited enterprise
that is approved by city and district governments and is registered with Lucheng’s
Bureau of Industry and Commerce. The registration asset was 6 million yuan, and
its services include information registration, information consultation, information
publication, and a financing docking service; it mainly aims to provide registration
service for private lending transactions. The service center is part of the pilot re-
form for Wenzhou’s financial system reform, with an aim to regulating the private
lending market in Wenzhou, bringing private money to the economy, and SME
entrepreneurship using legal procedures to reduce the financial risk in civil lending
and to explore a possible way of developing a healthy private lending sector.
10The operation mechanism of the service center is as follows. The creditor or
debtor registers their demand at the service center and selects intermediary agen-
cies at the center. The service center sends these inquiries to selected intermediary
agencies. When both parties agree on the lending contract, the transaction between
creditor and debtor will be registered with the center. The intermediary agency can
provide customer service for the creditor such as payment reminder services.
When the contract is due, the service center assesses and records the credibility of
the debtor.
11The 1998 statement “on suppression of illegal financial institutions and illegal fi-
nancial activities” by the State Council and the 2003 “regulatory methods for banking
industry” authorize the regulation of civil lending to the People’s Bank of China and
the China Bank Regulatory Committee and require local governments to provide sup-
port. However, they do not specify the relations between the two parties in regulating
the financial sector nor do they specify the content for supervision. Hence, in reality,
no real supervision or regulation has been carried out on many civil lending activities
(Chen 2008).
12This was approved at the 12th People’s Congress Standing Committee meeting in
Zhenjiang province, November 22, 2013, and officially introduced on March 1, 2014.
Articles 4, 5, and 8 provide detailed definition about the responsibilities and roles of
the service center.
13According to the 2nd article of the “P.R. China’s law on personal income tax,” inter-
est should be counted as personal income and thus tax must be paid on it; the 3rd art-
icle of the same law states that the tax rate for interest is 20 %. The 10th article in the
“State Administration of Taxation on sales tax questions and answers (one)” (the minis-
try of taxation [1995] number 156 document) states that regardless of the properties of
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the financial institutions, when loaning activities are involved interest on loans must be
taxed at a 5 % rate.
14For example, the legal definition is unclear for the two concepts “illegal absorb-
ing of public deposit” and “disguising the absorbing of public deposit.” Although
some administrative regulations give clear distinctions between the two concepts,
they still do not provide a clear definition for the concept “public deposit.”
15It should be noted that the government tends to not mention the supervisory
office in official announcements. This is because it will cause more liabilities for
the government if the public is aware of the government’s direct intervention in
the service center.
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